The election of Maithripala Sirisena, the common opposition
candidate and Health Minister in Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government until
November 2014, as Sri Lanka’s sixth Executive President is remarkable on
many counts. When Rajapaksa announced his decision to seek a third
term as president by amending the constitution, almost two years before
the completion of his term, no one believed that he would lose the
election. The main opposition party – the UNP – was internally
divided
and there was no credible opposition candidate in sight to challenge
Rajapaksa. Although the signs of Rajapaksa’s reducing popularity were
apparent during the Provincial elections conducted last year in March
(Southern and Western Provincial councils) and September (Uva
Provincial Council), his decision to advance the presidential election
was based on two related assessments: one, the opposition would not be
able to put up a credible common candidate; and two, he would be able
to get re-elected before his support base dwindled further.
But the defection of Sirisena in November 2014 proved to be a
political coup. Further, factors such as corruption, nepotism,
arrogance, inflation and dynastic politics all worked against Rajapaksa.
Power was completely monopolised by the Rajapaksa family and his
cronies, and it was exercised blatantly. State agencies were involved
in a number of attacks on journalists and critics of the regime.
Rajapaksa appointed close family members in State-owned companies and
leased out prime land in Colombo to foreign companies allegedly for a
price. He also blatantly attacked the judiciary, curtailed its
independence and impeached the Chief Justice when she objected to his
move to introduce the Devi Neguma Bill that would have subverted the
power of Provincial Councils. Rajapaksa also abolished the provisions
to create independent commissions by steamrollering the 17th Amendment.
Further, the 18th Amendment to the constitution effectively nullified
any institutional checks and balances. As a result of all this, many
people who hailed him as the saviour of the Sinhala nation when he
defeated the LTTE grew chary of his autocratic tendencies.
At the same time, Rajapaksa also alienated the minorities. The
orchestrated attacks on Muslims by the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), especially
the Aluthgama episode, and the attack on a church in Galle were grim
indicators of the prevalent state of affair. The Tamils were also
completely disillusioned. The promised political settlement was nowhere
in sight. Rather, the Rajapaksa government reinvented the LTTE threat
to justify the militarization of the North and East. And by granting
greater power to the retired general and war veteran G.A. Chandrasiri,
the Governor of Northern Province, Rajapaksa made the Northern
Provincial Council politically defunct.
Tasks and Challenges before Sirisena
Though Sirisena cannot perform a miracle and resolve the numerous
political and institutional crises, the most important task before him
is to reduce the powers of the Executive Presidency, which had been
introduced by J.R. Jayewardene in 1978 to safeguard his power from “the
whims and fancies of Parliament”. But no other President exercised the
overwhelming power vested in the Presidency and displayed arrogant
authoritarian tendencies as Rajapaksa did, and that too after the end
of the civil war and the decisive defeat of the LTTE. Sirisena will be
expected to restore both the institutional checks and balances which
saw an erosion as a result of the 18th Amendment to the constitution
and the faith of minorities in the pluralistic character of Sri Lankan
society. According to Sirisena’s election manifesto, “The new
constitution structure would be essentially an Executive allied with the
Parliament through cabinet instead of the present autocratic Executive
Presidential System”.
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Sirisena is also likely to face some major challenges. The most
important one is the management of the divergent interests of the
coalition that supported him and ensured his victory. He will need to
balance between two mutually contradictory elements within the
coalition: on one side stand the JHU and JVP, the champions of Sinhala
nationalism, who are against any devolution of power to the Tamil
provinces; and on the other is the Tamil National Alliance, which has
pinned its hope on devolution, demilitarization and release of land
under the Army’s occupation. Since Sirisena has the support of the UNP
and of former President Chandrika Kumaratunge, it appears that there
may not be major opposition to his attempt to address the genuine
concerns of the Tamils within the framework of the constitution.
However, he will need to address the concerns of the JHU and JVP as
well. The TNA, while announcing its support for his candidature, did
not ask for any assurance on its long standing grievances because it
did not wish to create unnecessary difficulties for Sirisena. In the
short term, the TNA is likely to focus on issues of immediate concern:
the reduction of the presence of the military, military interference in
the provincial administration, the release of land held by the military
in the High Security Zone, and possibly even the removal of the
Governor of Northern Province which will have a salutary effect on the
lives of the Tamils; but devolution would be its long term goal.
Another challenge before Sirisena will be to address the ethnic and
religious polarization that Rajapaksa had engineered in order to divide
and rule. The continued projection of the Tamils as the ‘ethnic other’
coupled with the effort to demonize the Muslim community as the
‘religious other’ have led to societal polarisation. For their part, of
course, the Tamils need to marginalize the extremist voice within
their community that feeds into this ethnic stereotype.
In addition, the new government needs to engage the international
community and particularly the West. Sirisena’s government will have to
handle the issue of the ongoing international investigation into the
final phase of the civil war and address a number of questions that
have been raised about the conduct of that war.
Finally, the immediate task before the new ‘National Unity Alliance
Government’ is to strike a balance between different institutions,
namely, President, Prime Minister and Parliament, and make the
President responsible to the Parliament. It would also need to take
steps to abolish the 18th Amendment to the constitution, which would
restore the independence of various commissions that were originally
envisaged under the 17th Amendment to the constitution.
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The process of democratization would also require limiting the
excessive powers enjoyed by the central government and enhance those of
the Provincial Councils to perform basic municipal functions. The
unfettering of democracy would work to the advantage of all the
stakeholders with an interest in fostering a multi-ethnic and plural
polity and maintaining democratic stability.
Implications for India
It appears that India-Sri Lanka relations are set to see better days
with the impending visit of President Sirisena to India next month as
the destination of his first foreign visit. Sirisena does not have the
political compulsions of Rajapakse and is unlikely to play the China
card to put pressure on New Delhi.
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Since the minorities have contributed significantly to his election, it
is likely that the new president would make an attempt to address the
long standing grievances of the Tamils. And this time around the “home
grown solution” would not take a decade to germinate. This too would
contribute to the forging of mutually beneficial ties between India and
Sri Lanka.