In a spectacular strike on the security forces, cadres belonging to
the CPI-Maoist ambushed a large team of police and paramilitary forces
and killed 14 personnel of the CRPF in Sukma district of Chhattisgarh
in December 2014. Ironically, two days before the attack, Chief
Minister Raman Singh had declared that, “The day is not far when the
state and Centre will together wipe out the Maoist menace and succeed
in making Chhattisgarh Naxal-free.”
The Sukma attack has punctured such optimistic assessments. It was by
far the gravest attack since the BJP-led NDA government assumed power
in New Delhi in May 2014. The previous major attack targeting the
security forces had occurred on 11 May 2014 in Maharashtra in which
seven C-60 police commandos had been killed when Maoists blew up a
police vehicle in Gadchiroli district. Between June and November 2014,
the average monthly fatalities among the security forces was less than
three – a comforting, yet complacency-inducing figure. The extremists,
on the other hand, had suffered 56 fatalities during the period.
Extremism-related fatalities usually decline during the monsoon,
which compels both the extremists and the security forces to scale down
their operations. In addition, the CPI-Maoist was rocked by a number
of high profile surrenders of some of its leaders. This led to the
further extension of the lean period of Maoist violence in 2014. In the
first 10 months of 2014, 472 Maoist cadres surrendered, compared with
283 in 2013. In his statement on the Sukma attack in Parliament, the
Home Minister referred to the success achieved by Chhattisgarh in terms
of the record surrender of the extremists, which has led to a
weakening of the "morale of the Maoists". The adverse operational
impact of the recent desertions from the so-called revolutionary path
has been acknowledged by the Maoists.
Maoists have overcome reverses
In the wake of the Sukma attack, it is apparent that the CPI-Maoist's
weather- and surrender-induced operational frailty is a matter of the
past. While it is convenient to interpret the Chhattisgarh attack as an
aberration and a desperate attempt by a dying outfit to prove a point,
a range of indicators – the continuing recruitment of cadres,
organisation of training camps, people's courts, and the outfit's foray
into new states such as Kerala – underline the fact that the Sukma
attack could be the beginning of the rejuvenation of left-wing
extremism (LWE).
Chief Minister Raman Singh had claimed on 30 November 2014 that
"Central security forces, state police jawans and officers are fighting
the menace of Naxalism with better coordination on every front." In
sharp contrast, only a few days earlier, the CRPF chief had accused the
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand governments of underutilising the central
forces. Be that as it may, the CRPF, designated as the primary
counter-insurgency force of the country over a decade ago, needs better
leadership. The force has consistently fallen short in the provision
of even basic logistics support to its personnel engaged in
counter-insurgency operations. The modernisation plans of the state
police forces are also continuing to stagnate.
Need for a Comprehensive Strategy
Maoist attacks on the security forces and the symbols of state power
are characterised by meticulous planning, systematic preparation,
near-surgical execution and a high degree of coordination. On several
occasions, the rebels have achieved considerable success in launching
synchronised attacks on multiple targets involving large numbers of
cadres. For the Maoists, besides waging a protracted people’s war with
the ultimate objective of capturing or seizing political power,
participating in a peace process and talks is a ‘tactic’ and considered
‘war by other means’.
The response of various state governments and the Centre is
invariably reactive. While the Maoists have been expanding to newer
areas and have been steadily enhancing their military capabilities,
counter-Naxal operations have mostly been lackadaisical. The reasons
for this apathetic approach are three-fold. Firstly, Naxal terrorism is
not an emotive issue at the national level like the insurgency in
Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, there is some confusion about whether the
Naxalites are terrorists or not as they have a ‘social justice’ tag
attached to them. And, lastly, an impression has gained currency that
the Naxal menace is not “as bad as the media makes it out to be.”
Coordination between the police and intelligence agencies of various
affected states has been generally unsatisfactory. The acquisition,
compilation, collation, analysis, synthesis and dissemination of
intelligence are inadequate. The Naxalites are continuing to spread
their tentacles and it is crucial that intelligence about their
activities, arms and equipment, training, sources of funding and future
operations is shared on a daily basis so that it trickles down in near
real-time to the functional level. A national-level data base of all
terrorist groups and individuals is an inescapable operational
necessity.
State police forces and the Central armed police forces (CAPFs) need
to be better equipped and trained like the army to successfully combat
the serious threat posed by the Naxalites. At present they lack the
army’s organisational structure and cohesiveness, the army’s
institutionalised operational experience and ethos and its outstanding
junior leadership – qualities that are mandatory for success in
counter-insurgency operations. A great deal more needs to be done if
the states are to effectively coordinate anti-Maoist operations across
their borders.
The Maoist threat presents a clear and present danger. So far the
national response has been inadequate, both at the policy formulation
and execution levels. To cope with this serious threat, India needs a
well-deliberated and finely calibrated strategy with matching
operational doctrines and the allotment of necessary resources. Only a
skilfully planned and coordinated strategy, with all stakeholders
pooling in their resources to achieve synergy in execution, will
achieve the desired results. At the same time, a comprehensive
socio-economic strategy must be evolved to treat the root causes of
this malaise that is gnawing away at the nation’s innards, along with a
carefully drawn up plan for perception management. Good governance,
development, security and perception management must go hand in hand.
